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I. Introduction
Long-term private financial flows-including foreign direct investment (FDI), cross-border bank lending, bond and equity financing, as well as remittances-may assume a crucial role in helping attain the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Even though bond financing accounted for only 14 per cent of international private capital flows to developing countries in 2012, much lower than FDI, which made up about 60 per cent, it was much more important than Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF), which together made up only 1 per cent total international capital flows to developing countries in the same year (World Bank, 2013, p. 23 ).
To date, local currency bond markets (LCBMs) still play a minor role in the long-term private financing of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies, because capital markets are not well developed in this region. However, experiences of developing countries in other regions, such as Asia, suggest that LCBMs can potentially take on an important role in SSA too in the future. One indicator for the nascent stage of bond market development in SSA is the outstanding stock of government securities, which accounted for only 14.8 per cent of GDP in 2010 on average, being significantly lower than in other developing, emerging, and advanced economies. A further indicator of the shallowness of the LCBMs in SSA is that government securities issues significantly exceed corporate bond issues. Government securities made up nearly 90 per cent of total outstanding local currency denominated bonds in 2010. Compared to other regions of the world, the difference between these two types of securities is much larger in SSA (IMF, 2013, p. 40; Mu et al., 2013) .
The development of LCBMs can contribute to mobilizing long-term domestic financial resources for achieving the SDGs, in particular for much-needed local or regional infrastructure investments. One main prerequisite for LCBMs meeting this goal is that capital markets as well as banks are able to assume their transformation role of converting relatively short-term deposits into long-term investments in infrastructure (World Bank, 2013, p. 24) . By means of issuing infrastructure project bonds, capital is generated for specific projects.
1 Kenya, for example, has successfully issued infrastructure bonds since 2009, raising money for water, road, and energy projects. The issuance of these government bonds has made it easier to issue corporate bonds of private or state-owned enterprises (IMF, 2014, p. 48) .
Even though the significance of LCBMs in SSA for long-term investments is currently limited compared to alternative sources of long-term financing, LCBMs represent a promising instrument to provide long-term financing in the future. There may be various benefits in developing LCBMs in SSA. One main advantage is that LCBMs can contribute to improving capital allocation by offering alternative sources of financing and by diversifying risks among different groups of investors, both domestic and foreign. Another advantage is that domestic debt markets may contribute to a better financial intermediation and promote domestic investments.
Moreover, LCBMs may alleviate the effects of debt and financial crises as well as other external shocks on the domestic economy. By reducing the dependency on foreign debt, LCBMs can also alleviate the 'original sin' problem and thereby reduce the risk of currency mismatches (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999; Khan, 2005; IMF, 2007, p. 55, and 2013, p. 39; Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009, p. 3; Berensmann, 2010; Maziad et al., 2013, pp. 5-7; Essers et al., 2015, pp. 6-7) . Moreover, as pointed out by Arnone and Presbitero (2010) , building the institutional infrastructure for the issuance of domestic public debt can support the organization and functioning of local financial markets at large.
Against this backdrop, this article examines the factors which may impede and promote LCBM development in SSA. Our analysis focuses on sovereign debt, not only because this makes up the lion's share of LCBMs in SSA, but also because liquid local currency sovereign debt markets are considered a prerequisite for the development of vibrant local currency corporate bond markets (e.g. Dittmar and Yuan, 2008) . The next section briefly presents recent trends and challenges of LCBM development in SSA. Subsequently, section III econometrically analyses patterns of LCBM development in SSA. Section IV highlights some experiences with bond market development from emerging markets in Asia and Latin America and discusses possible lessons for countries in SSA. Section V concludes with policy recommendations.
II. Recent trends in and challenges for LCBM development in SSA
A key development over the past decade has been the increasing reliance of governments in SSA on markets for debt financing. As Figure 1 shows, governments in SSA have increasingly used marketable debt, comprising bonds, notes, and money market instruments, as opposed to nonmarketable debt, which consists mainly of loans by official bilateral or multilateral creditors, such as the World Bank, and loans by commercial banks. There was a slight decrease in reliance on markets for debt financing in 2008 and 2009, possibly in response to actual or expected difficulties in raising funds through markets in the wake of the global financial crisis. Yet, overall, there is a positive trend in the share of marketable debt to total debt. Table 1 presents these cross-national differences for a selection of countries in SSA for which data are available, for the period before and after the global financial crisis. It is remarkable that the average ratios of marketable debt to total debt increased compared to the pre-crisis period, notably in the categories of low-income and lower middle-income countries, as classified by the World Bank. This suggests that the overall positive trend in the use of markets for debt financing in SSA shown in Figure 1 has not been driven by individual or upper middle-income countries. If we turn to local currency treasury bond market development, the picture that emerges is more ambiguous. At present, the database of the African Development Bank's African Financial Market Initiative (AFMI) seems to have the largest coverage of local currency treasury bonds, in terms of both countries and years. Since there remain significant gaps in the dataset for many SSA countries up to the year 2006, in the following analysis we focus on developments within the years 2007 to 2012. As Figure 3 shows, local currency treasury bond issuance as share of GDP in SSA increased from 2007 onwards and decreased after 2010. The regional aggregate disguises significant differences in the amounts of local currency sovereign bonds issued between SSA countries in different income groups. While local currency treasury bonds issued in the period 2010-12 on average amounted to 8.6 per cent and 7.1 per cent of GDP in Mauritius and Ghana, respectively, it was virtually zero in Benin (Table 2) . However, there has been an increase in the average size of local currency treasury bonds in all three groups of countries, lowincome, lower middle-income, and upper middle income countries, from the first period to the second period . In addition, the data suggest that low-income countries issue on average a smaller amount of bonds as share of GDP than do middle-income countries. As To what extent have LCBMs in SSA deepened in recent years? Using the ratio of local currency treasury bonds outstanding to GDP as a measure of the depth of the local currency treasury bond market, Figure 4 shows that in SSA as a whole LCBMs have deepened between 2007 and 2012.
That said, the amount of local currency treasury bonds outstanding has slightly declined between 2010 and 2012. The maturity profile presents another important indicator for LCBM development (Bua et al., 2014) . Short maturities enhance rollover risks and contribute to macroeconomic vulnerability.
Yet governments may prefer to issue short-term debt if the yield curve is strongly upwardsloping, since borrowing costs increase significantly with longer tenors. Generally speaking, LCBMs in SSA are still shallow, especially for longer-dated maturities, but several governments-including South Africa, Botswana, and Nigeria-have been able to issue longerterm debt. The average maturity of bonds differs significantly among SSA countries, as depicted in Figure 5 . It is notable that in Ghana, where the local currency treasury bond market has deepened significantly over recent years, the average tenure of these bonds is still one of the shortest across the region. This shows that confidence in Ghanaian local currency government bonds is still limited.
Short maturities of government securities represent a major structural challenge for LCBM development in SSA. If governments issue only short-term papers, this obstructs the development of secondary markets, since investors are likely to hold their papers to maturity.
Moreover, along with an insufficient issuance of government securities, it will prevent the emergence of a yield curve for government securities which can be used to price cash-flows off the curve. A liquid yield curve is generally seen as important for price discovery in the bond market. The lack of a secondary market and a yield curve for sovereign bonds inhibits the development of corporate bond markets, since government bonds cannot assume their benchmarking role (Dittmar and Yuan, 2008) . And of course, undeveloped domestic debt markets increase rollover risks, generate higher interest rates, and reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy (IMF, 2013, p. 40 ). The cost of bond borrowing measured by the average yield also differs substantially across SSA economies, as shown in Figure 6 . The yield is an important indicator for LCBM development because it reflects risk perceptions and confidence in the market. Bua et al. (2014, p. 11 ) find that in low-income countries the cost of domestic public debt and the share of long-term instruments is negatively correlated, suggesting that 'debt portfolios of longer maturity face lower cost than debt portfolios of shorter maturity'. This can be observed in SSA, too. While the South African government, for instance, benefits from comparatively lower yields and longer Sy (2007) , there are various reasons why local commercial banks in SSA typically have a big appetite for government securities. With high yields even at relatively short maturities, banks have a strong incentive to invest in (supposedly) safe government securities rather than private-sector projects. Moreover, in most SSA countries interest earned on government bonds is tax exempt, while sovereign bonds carry a zero risk weight in the calculation of capital adequacy ratios. While this improves the funding situation of the government, the drawback, however, is a possible crowding out effect, i.e. when commercial banks allocate a large share of their assets to sovereign debt, private saving may be used for government financing rather than private investment (Bua et al., 2014) . Abbas and Christensen (2010) have shown that the growth effect of domestic public debt is higher for marketable instruments that are held by non-bank investors. A more diversified ownership is crucial to eliminating the crowding-out effect. Moreover, a more differentiated investor base can reduce financial vulnerability since a large exposure of domestic banks to their home governments' debt can cause 'disruptive self-reinforcing feedback loops' (Gros, 2013, p. 93 ) when either the banks or the sovereign encounter problems. Last but not least, a narrow investor base also hinders the development of secondary markets. The literature on bond market development has identified several other structural challenges in building up LCBMs which also appear to have a significant impact on the development of LCBMs in SSA. Several factors impede the issuance and monitoring of domestic debt, including a lack of an efficient institutional structure and a solid legal framework. Similarly, a lack of personnel trained in debt management, crucial for the issuance of domestic securities, contributes to the slow development of LCBMs in this region. A further problem is that government bonds could crowd out corporate bonds (IMF, 2007, pp. 64-5, and 2014, p. 40; Arnone and Presbitero, 2010) . The slow pace of LCBM development in SSA is also related to the fact that often real interest costs of domestic issuance at longer maturities significantly exceed foreign borrowing costs, mainly because there is little trust in the markets due to high expected inflation rates and a lack of secondary market liquidity (IMF et al., 2013) . Furthermore, there may be additional risks for investments in sustainable development owing to a lack of information and of internalization of environmental and social costs (Waygood, 2014) .
The picture that emerges from this discussion of recent trends in the development of sovereign bond markets in SSA is that LCBMs are, indeed, at a nascent stage but have seen significant development progress over the past decade. This suggests that it is the right time to learn and think about ways to spur the continued development of these markets but also about potential risks of LCBM development. In following section, we focus on the first issue and examine empirically the factors which may hinder and promote the development of LCMBs. There is little empirical research on the drivers of bond market development in SSA to date, and empirical scholarship on local currency bond market development in SSA is even more scant.
III. Patterns of LCBM development in
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One major reason for this is probably the historical predominance of external borrowing, and hence of foreign rather than local currency debt in low-income countries (Bua et al., 2014) .
Another reason is most certainly the poor quality and availability of data on debt in SSA. The data situation has only improved very recently, opening up opportunities for empirical research on the patterns of bond market development in SSA. Bua et al. (2014) , for instance, introduce a new dataset on domestic debt in low-income countries which covers 40 countries, of which 29 are in SSA, in the period 1971-2011 and provides cross-country comparable data both on the stock of domestic debt and its structure, including detailed information on maturity, currency composition, creditor base, and the type of instruments. In the dataset constructed by Bua et al. (2014) , however, domestic debt refers primarily to debt owed to residents, rather than to debt denominated in local currency, which is the focus of our paper. In another recent study, Essers et al. (2015) Drawing from the African Development Bank's AFMI database, among others, we compile a dataset comprising 27 SSA countries, ranging over a maximum of 14 years, namely the period 2000-13. For sure, our sample size remains limited as well, weakening the power of statistical tests, and the time span of data on the stock of local currency bonds differs across countries in our dataset. Overall, however, we are confident that our analysis, which is based on a comparatively large dataset, will help to generate novel and more robust insights in LCBM development in SSA and the question of whether patterns in LCBM development in SSA are different from patterns elsewhere.
(i) Model specification
Following existing studies on the determinants of LCBM development such as Essers et al. (2015) and Mu et al. (2013) , we employ a model of the following form:
where Y i,t is the dependent variable, i.e. the outstanding amount of local currency treasury bonds as a percentage of GDP for country i in year t; this variable is our indicator for the depth of LCBMs; X i,t-1 is a vector of 1-year lagged explanatory variables derived from the literature and described below; µ i are country-specific effects and ε i,t is an error term. While it is not possible to establish causal relationships with the data and models we use, we seek at a minimum to ensure that changes in the explanatory variable precede changes in the dependent variable by using lags of the explanatory variables.
Our main interest is to explore the variation of LCBM development across countries in SSA, rather than the variation within countries over time with models using country fixed effects (FE).
The reasons for the focus on cross-country variation are threefold. First, comparing the overall, between, and within variation in Appendix Table A2 suggests that for our dependent and most explanatory variables, most variation arises from differences between countries rather than from changes within countries over time. This predominance of cross-country variation would render it difficult to discover significant relationships with fixed-effects models, which examine variation within countries over time. Second, our time series for LCBM development is relatively short, covering at a maximum 14 years and with the availability of data on LCBM development being limited for several countries before 2004. 4 Finally, we focus on examining cross-country rather than within-country variation to allow for the comparison with other studies on the determinants of local currency bond market development such as Claessens et al. (2007) , Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) , and Eichengreen et al. (2008) , each of which focuses on the cross-country dimension of variation in LCBM development.
Specifically, we employ two different estimators. First, as our baseline model, we employ pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) to address panel heteroscedasticity; this model assumes a common intercept across countries (δ = 0). Second, as our main model, we employ the random effects (RE) model with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and a correction for autocorrelation, following other studies such as Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Eichengreen et al. (2008) ; this estimator models the countryspecific constant terms µ i as distributed randomly across countries and as independent from the other explanatory variables.
(ii) LCBM development-the dependent variable
We complement the existing literature by using data on local currency marketable central government bonds from the African Development Bank's AFMI. The AFMI data are available for a larger set of SSA countries than the set of countries included in the analysis by Essers et al. (2015) , 6 allowing us to gain insights on the correlates of LCBM development based on a different and larger set of countries. Our analysis is also different from other studies in that we focus on treasury bonds of a maturity of 1 year or greater. While for instance Essers et al. (2015) include short-term government securities with a maturity of less than 1 year in their analysis, we exclude them because short-term securities may be less appropriate instruments to finance the long-term investments needed to achieve the SDGs.
To measure the depth of LCBMs we use a variable capturing the total amount of medium-and long-term (maturity of 1 year or more) sovereign bonds in local currency outstanding as percentage of GDP (Bonds to GDP). The data on the total amount of bonds outstanding are from the AFMI database, the GDP data are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank (2014).
5 With a view to facilitating the comparison with other studies and as additional robustness checks we used three additional estimators, the results of which are presented in the online appendix and are not discussed here in detail. First, we used a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) which accounts for heteroscedastic error structures and panel-specific autocorrelation. Second, we used an FE model, which employs heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and country and period FEs; an AR1 error model, which employs panel-corrected standard errors, country FE, and a Prais-Winston transformation to address the serial correlation of errors that was suggested by the Wooldridge test for serial correlation. Prais-Winston regressions involve a transformation of the data based on an estimate of the autocorrelation of the error terms. Country FE serve to capture country-specific constant factors, which, if not included in the model, would give rise to omitted variable bias. Yet eliminating time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between countries comes at the cost of less efficient estimates. Specifically, it is not possible to examine the effects of time-invariant explanatory variables such as the legal origin and the cross-country dimension of variation in the explanatory variable more generally. 6 Table A1 in the on-line appendix provides an overview over the African countries included in our sample and the sample of countries in some selected studies.
(iii) Explanatory variables
In selecting the explanatory variables of the analysis, we follow various studies that examine the drivers of bond market development in Africa and elsewhere, allowing us to draw conclusions on whether the determinants of LCBM development in SSA are the same as elsewhere. The first group of explanatory variables relates to economic structure. There is some evidence for a positive relationship between country size and bond market development from studies which focus on regions other than Africa. 7 One possible reason is that smaller-sized economies face greater obstacles to bond market development because economies of scale, which are important to reduce the costs of the establishment of LCBMs, are more difficult to realize (Claessens et al., 2007, p. 379) . Another possible reason for a positive relationship between country size and bond market development is that larger economies offer greater diversification benefits to foreign investors (Hausmann and Panizza, 2003) . The greater availability of (potential) buyers and sellers in larger-sized economies may also enhance bond market development by reducing price volatility (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004) . We use the natural log of GDP in Following Essers et al. (2015) and Mu et al. (2013) , we also include a measure for trade openness. Trade openness may be positively correlated with financial development for several reasons. One reason may be that trade openness supports bond market development indirectly by encouraging an economic dynamic and institutional development in ways not completely captured by other variables (Eichengreen et al., 2008, p. 265) . Another reason may be that established industrial interests may be less opposed to financial development despite encouraging market entry and benefiting newcomers when an economy allows cross-border trade flows (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . 9 Yet a negative correlation is also plausible as countries which are less integrated into world markets may have more incentive to develop domestic bond market markets in order to meet their financing needs (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009 ). We use WDI data on the total exports of goods and services as a share of GDP (trade to GDP) as an indicator for trade openness.
The size of the banking sector may also affect LCBM development. As banks play an important role in the development of liquid and functioning bond markets as dealers and market-makers, a more developed banking sector may be positively associated with bond market development (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004, p. 13) . In addition, in most SSA countries banks are the major class of government bond investors, suggesting a well-developed banking sector may enhance bond market development. However, a larger banking sector may also be associated with lower bond market development as powerful banks may oppose bond market development which breeds competition (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009 ) or as banks may substitute for bond financing. To probe the relationship between banking sector development and bond market development we employ as an indicator for the size of the banking sector private credit by banks as share of GDP (private credit to GDP), again taken from the World Bank's WDI database.
In addition, we include in some specifications a variable capturing the sum of rents from oil, minerals, and gas as a share of GDP (resource rents to GDP) from the WDI. 10 We include this structural economic variable because there is some evidence that resource dependence influences financial sector development (Beck, 2011) , and resource dependence is quite prevalent in the African context. As regards LCBM development, the direction of the expected relationship is ambiguous. On the one hand, windfall gains from the extraction of natural resources may reduce the government's demand for financing and hence the incentives for LCBM development. On the other hand, large natural resource revenues increase the creditworthiness of the government which may encourage LCBM development. We include resource rents to GDP only in some of our baseline models because the availability of data for this variable is limited.
The second group of explanatory variables captures macroeconomic policy choices. One of these variables is the fiscal balance, defined as revenues minus expenditure. There is some evidence for a negative relationship between the fiscal balance and bond market development (Mu et al., 2013; Essers et al., 2015) . Yet a priori, the effect of the fiscal balance on bond market development is ambiguous: the government's financing needs may provide an important impetus 10 Rents are defined in this study as the difference between the price of a commodity and the average cost of producing it.
for LCBM development (Maziad et al., 2013) . More negative fiscal balances (that is, larger fiscal deficits) may thus be positively associated with LCBM development. Yet large fiscal deficits may also raise doubts about macroeconomic stability and the government's ability to repay debt among potential investors and may thus have a negative influence on sovereign bond market development. Moreover, it is plausible to assume in the African context that the fiscal balance is endogenous to bond market development, as the ability to run fiscal deficits is likely to be constrained by bond market development (Essers et al., 2015) . We follow other scholars such as Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) There is considerable empirical evidence that high inflation rates, indicating low monetary policy credibility and thus the likelihood that creditors' interest rate earnings might be eroded by inflation, are an obstacle to LCBM development (Hausmann and Panizza, 2003; Claessens et al., 2007; Essers et al., 2015) . Moreover, in countries with a history of high inflation, governments are likely to face pressure to offer higher coupon rates on fixed-rate bonds ex ante, which could result in higher real interest costs if the expected inflation does not materialize ex post, rendering the issuance of such bonds less attractive to governments in the first place (Essers et al., 2015) .
We include WDI data on the inflation rate as measured by the annual change in the consumer price index as an explanatory variable and-admittedly imperfect-proxy of monetary policy credibility.
We also include capital account openness as an explanatory variable. Ex ante, the effect is ambiguous. On the one hand, an open capital account may help promote bond market development, for instance by encouraging foreign investors to enter the market. Claessens et al. (2007, p. 389) argue that an open capital account also raises the interest of domestic investors in bonds by exposing countries to greater market discipline. On the other hand, capital controls may prevent domestic capital from leaving the country and thus create a captive investor base (Forslund et al., 2011) . We follow existing research, such as Essers et al. (2015) , in using the The third group of explanatory variables we consider refers to the quality of institutions. We include a variable capturing the legal origin because there is some evidence that in countries whose legal rules originate in the British common law tradition as opposed to the civil law tradition financial markets are more developed, arguably because legal rules originating in the British common law tradition tend to offer a better protection to investors. 12 We construct a dummy variable capturing whether a country has a British legal origin or not.
There is considerable evidence from studies on other world regions that there is a positive relationship between the ability of the government to pursue policies that promote private-sector development and the rule of law on the one hand, and bond market development on the other (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004; Burger and Warnock, 2006) . 13 We therefore include an additional variable, governance, which is a composite indicator based on two indices from the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset (Kaufmann et al., 2014) , namely regulatory quality 14 Polity2 measures regime types on a scale ranging from -0.1 (strongly autocratic) to +0.1 (strongly democratic). Data are taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2014) .
(iv) Caveats
While our model specifications build on existing studies on bond market development in developing and emerging economies, there remain some important methodological concerns.
The most serious concern is in regard to the limited number of observations due to missing values. As Appendix Table A2 , which presents the descriptive statistics for our dependent and explanatory variables, shows, our sample covers a maximum of 27 SSA countries and a maximum of 14 years, but due to missing values (and the use of a 1-year lag of the explanatory variables) the analysis that follows extends to no more than 248 observations. 15 The limited number of observations limits both the power of statistical tests and the degree to which the results may be generalisable across SSA.
In addition, our models, the POLS with PCSE model and the RE model, do not address potential reverse causality and endogeneity beyond using lags of the explanatory variables. We would have liked to use a modelling approach which gives more weight to dynamics, for instance by incorporating a greater number of lags for the explanatory variables, or using an error correction 14 An excellent overview is provided by Haber et al. (2008) . Evidence for a positive relationship between democracy and bond market development is provided, for instance, by Claessens et al. (2007) and Essers et al. (2015) . 15 Our dependent variable, for instance, is available for a maximum of 27 (countries) times 14 (years) minus 120 (missings), that is 258 observations. model. 16 However, as outlined above, the most significant part of variation in our sample is cross-country rather than intertemporal variation, rendering the use of more dynamic approaches and the estimation of long-and short-term effects difficult. 17 That said, we still think that the empirical analysis in this article helps to improve our understanding of LCBMs in SSA and complements existing studies because it relies on a novel, relatively large dataset with a focus on SSA, hence the ability to probe the robustness of the results of existing studies and compare our results with those relating to other world regions. Tables 5 and 6 show the estimation results of our regression models. The estimation results of the POLS with PCSE are presented in Table 5 and the estimation results of the RE model are presented in Table 6 . While the estimation results for the two different models differ slightly, five variables seem to be quite robustly correlated with LCBM development.
(v) Results
(vi) Results of regression models
First, countries with greater economic size, as measured by the natural log of GDP, seem to have more developed LCBMs. This result is in line with the findings of other studies such as Mu et al. (2013, p. 131 ), Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) , and Claessens et al. (2007) . (2004) and Essers et al. (2015) , also present results that suggest that there is a significant and positive relationship between the size of the banking sector and trade openness on the one hand, and LCBM development on the other. The finding that countries with a more developed banking sector tend to be the ones with more developed bond markets is in line with the finding that commercial banks have, on balance, remained the dominant investor class in LCBMs in SSA (Essers et al., 2015) . Fourth, there is a significant and negative relationship between foreign exchange reserves and the development of LCBMs. While this result appears to be counterintuitive at first, one possible explanation is that large foreign exchange reserves tend to be associated with current account surpluses, which means that a country is accumulating foreign assets, which may come at the expense of domestic investments into LCBMs. Fifth, governance is significantly and positively correlated with LCBM development. This finding is in line with the argument that a strong regulatory framework promotes financial deepening and with results by others such as Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Essers et al. (2015) . In addition, capital account openness is positively correlated with LCBM development in most of our specifications, a finding that also emerges in the analysis of Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) , which examines the 20 The positive and significant relationship between economic size and the development of LCBMs is also the most robust result emerging from our additional analyses using FGLS and FE models to examine intertemporal variation. The results are presented in the online appendix.
determinants of local currency government bond markets in developed and developing countries in various world regions.
As regards the remaining explanatory variables, the evidence of a significant relationship with LCBM development is less robust. Specifically, the results from the POLS with PCSE suggests that there is a negative relationship between LCBM development and fiscal deficits, but this result does not hold for the RE model. Countries with British legal origin appear to have less developed LCBMs than others, a finding that contradicts results from other studies such as the analysis of LCBMs in SSA by Essers et al. (2015) , but has also been found by others, such as Eichengreen et al. (2008) , who analyse LCBM with a focus on Latin America. There is some evidence that countries which are more democratic have more developed LCBMs, although this result only holds if we do not control for resource dependence. Finally, in two out of eight models there is some evidence that lower stages of economic development are associated with deeper LCBMs. 21 While this finding is surprising, other studies of the determinants of LCBM development, for instance Essers et al. (2015) and Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) , present similar results. One possible explanation is that governments in richer economies have a broader fiscal base which allows them to rely less on LCBM financing. Table 7 summarizes the main results of the analyses presented above and provides a comparison with the findings of the study of the drivers of LCBM development in SSA by Essers et al. (2015) and of three studies which focus on other regions, namely Claessens et al. (2007) , who examine the drivers of LCBM development in a global sample covering emerging and developed economies; Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) , who examine the drivers of LCBM development using a global sample with a focus on Asia; and Eichengreen et al. (2008) , who examine the drivers of domestic bond market development in Latin America. 22 The picture that emerges is that in SSA, as in other world regions, there appear to be benefits for LCBM development if countries are larger in economic terms, if they have larger banking systems, if
they are more open to trade, and if they have better regulatory frameworks and rule of law. In our empirical analysis, fiscal deficits are not as consistently negatively associated with local currency bond market development as was the case in some previous studies of LCBMs in Africa and elsewhere. Likewise, and perhaps surprisingly, macroeconomic stability as measured by inflation rates and exchange rate volatility does not come out as a significant factor in our 21 As the table presented in the online appendix suggests, this finding is also supported by some of our additional analyses using feasible GLS and FE estimators. 22 Our focus is on the results of the regression models where government bond market development is the dependent variable.
analyses, while we find larger foreign exchange reserves to have a negative impact on LCBM development. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Notes: + = relationship positive and significant; -= relationship negative and significant. As regards results from the analysis presented in this paper, we only report a relationship as 'significant' in this table where results are significant in all more fully specified models, i.e. in all models which include besides other variables the variables relating to the quality of institutions (Polity2, governance, and British legal origin). n.a. = not applicable because not included in the analysis.
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IV. Lessons from emerging markets
Since the emerging market crises of the late 1990s, many emerging markets have sought to develop LCBMs to reduce foreign currency debt and overcome the currency and maturity mismatch problems that had previously contributed to financial vulnerability. This strategy has been apparently quite successful (Turner, 2012) as markets in Latin America and
Emerging Asia managed to significantly increase the share of bonds denominated in local currency (Table 8) . LCBMs provided an important cushion during the Global Financial Crisis when US and European financial institutions struggled for survival and would no longer extend credit to emerging markets. Note: *End September 2011. Source: Turner (2012).
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Since experiences differ significantly across economies, both emerging and mature, it is difficult to pinpoint one single element of reform or practice that will help the emergence of a deep and liquid LCBM (Luengnaruemitchai and Ong, 2005) . Broadly speaking, the experiences of emerging economies in Asia and Latin America confirm the importance of the variables that we found to be significant in our empirical analysis of the drivers and obstacles to LCBM development in SSA. 24 However, it is important to point out that in both Latin
American and Asian countries successes in LCBM development can be linked to concerted policy efforts at the national level, which have been supported by regional and international While a greater participation of foreign investors may lower long-term government bond yields (Peris, 2010) and increase market liquidity, a high dependency on a foreign investor base increases the risk of sudden outflows and spillovers from global markets. As pointed out by Azis et al. (2013) :
while the growth of individual bond markets in recent years has been impressive, the threat of financial contagion to emerging Asian bond markets from shock and volatility spillovers in mature markets is real. Although emerging Asian local bond market volatilities are more determined by their own respective shocks and volatilities, in some markets the direct shock and volatility spillovers remain significant.
Consequentially, broadening the investor base has been identified as a key challenge in further developing market resilience (ADB, 2013) . In this context it should be emphasized that a high concentration of local sovereign bond holdings in the domestic banking system is equally dangerous, because sovereign debt problems can trigger a banking crisis and vice versa (as recently seen in Europe).
Moreover, in order to deal effectively with periods of rapid capital outflows, financial authorities need to develop tools for managing the capital account, which may also include the temporary re-imposition of capital controls (cf. IMF, 2012). 
V. Conclusions and policy recommendations
In this article we discussed the importance of LCBMs as a source of long-term financing for development and used a new dataset to investigate the factors that may help or inhibit LCBM development in SSA. Our empirical analysis of the relationship between a broad set of macroeconomic and institutional variables on the one side and LCBM development on the other pointed towards several factors that may be particularly important for LCBM development. Notably, we found greater economic size, larger banking sectors, greater openness to trade, and better regulatory quality and rule of law to be positively related to LCBM development. These findings are broadly in line with those of other studies on bond market development in SSA and other world regions.
A central challenge for developing LCBMs in SSA is to widen the investor base. Our analysis suggests that in SSA, countries with a more developed banking sector tend to be the ones with more developed LCBMs, which is in tune with the finding that commercial banks have, on balance, remained the dominant investor class in LCBMs in SSA. However, the dominance of banks among investors in LCBMs is problematic for several reasons. Since banks usually prefer a short-term portfolio allocation, it becomes more difficult for the government to issue longer maturities, which raises the rollover risk for the government (Bua et al., 2014) .
Moreover, a large exposure of domestic banks to domestic sovereign debt and a heavy reliance of governments on financing through domestic banks can cause mutually destabilizing effects when either the banks or the sovereign experiences a crisis.
From these empirical findings and the qualitative findings on the challenges of LCBM development in SSA we derive several policy recommendations. 26 To overcome the problems associated with small economic size and small banking systems-including illiquid debt instruments, short maturities, a restricted and undifferentiated investor base, and undeveloped secondary markets-regional bond market development initiatives such as those initiated in Asia should be promoted in SSA, including initiatives for harmonizing legal and regulatory frameworks and for facilitating the cross-listing of bonds on several national exchanges.
To promote LCBM development, authorities in SSA should also address institutional and legal deficiencies to ensure the enforcement of laws and enhance the safety of the investment environment. This may include ensuring and alleviating profit repatriation, lowering payment delays, and guaranteeing contract viability. To overcome problems impeding the issuance of 26 Some of these policy recommendations comply with those proposed by Adegelan and Radzweicz-Bak, (2009) and IMF et al. (2013) .
domestic debt it is important to establish an adequate infrastructure including the institutional structure and a solid legal framework. For better monitoring of domestic sovereign debt an appropriate debt management strategy needs to be put in place. It is also important to train personnel in the field of debt management adequately because these skills are needed for issuing domestic securities.
In the area of debt management, donors can be helpful in providing technical assistance. (Berensmann, 2015) . Clearly, the sequencing and intensity of these policy measures will depend on the stage of the LCBM development as well as on the role that is envisaged for LCBMs in the respective countries.
As pointed out, foreign investor participation broadens the investor base and can give a boost to market development, yet it may also increase volatility of international capital flows.
Hence, capital market liberalization should be pursued only very cautiously and in pace with solid financial and institutional development.
Despite the various challenges for LCBM development in SSA and associated risks, they can become an important source for providing long-or medium-term capital not only for governments but also for companies. Although the development of local currency sovereign debt markets may theoretically divert investment away from private entrepreneurial activity, the emergence of a liquid yield curve for government securities is a crucial precondition for the development of an efficient corporate bond market. By releasing long-term funds for much-needed public infrastructure financing as well as facilitating corporate investment, the development of sovereign and corporate debt markets can make important contributions to sustainable development in SSA. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
